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A TRIBUTE TO LOUIS SOHN-IS THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION WORKING?
BERNARD H. OxmAN*
It is not possible for me to convey to you fully my sense of per-
sonal and professional honor at being invited to participate in this
symposium in remembrance of Professor Louis Sohn.
Louis Sohn and I first had the opportunity to work closely
together when he, the late John R. Stevenson, then Legal Adviser
of the Department of State, and I began to formulate the position
of the United States with respect to the settlement of disputes in
connection with the negotiation of a new Convention on the Law
of the Sea (Convention). When John Stevenson and I first elabo-
rated on U.S. views regarding preparations for the Third U.N. Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea in the American Journal of
International Law, we took the then-unprecedented step of indicat-
ing not only that the United States would seek a system of compul-
sory and binding third-party dispute settlement as an integral part
of any new convention but also that the utility of any such conven-
tion was in significant measure linked to the inclusion of a compul-
sory dispute settlement system.'
This suggests an appropriate perspective on the topic suggested
by Sean Murphy for my remarks today, namely whether the dispute
settlement system is working. For in significant measure, this ques-
tion affords us a seamless transition from the first panel this morn-
ing, which addressed a similar question with respect to the
Convention as a whole. To determine whether the dispute settle-
ment system is working, we must consider its objectives, and those
objectives include but are not necessarily limited to the overall
goals of the Convention as a whole.
In this regard, we might consider that the dispute settlement sys-
tem set forth in the Convention functions simultaneously as part of
two regimes. The first regime, which explains its very existence, is
the regime for the oceans. That regime is established by a very
* Richard A. Hawler Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. SeeJohn R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea
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widely ratified Convention that emerged from the political caul-
dron of decades of international negotiation and constitutional
processes that would be difficult to duplicate. Viewed in that con-
text, the dispute settlement system is part and parcel of a much
larger system of treaty obligations expressly assumed by the parties
to the Convention in their own interest and in the general interest.
The second regime, which transcends that Convention, is the
broader regime for the settlement of international disputes. In this
respect, it is useful to recall two central points about that broader
regime: first, states continue to adhere to the position that express
consent is required to afford jurisdiction to an international tribu-
nal; second, the majority of states have not accepted compulsory
arbitration or adjudication of all or even most international legal
disputes, including some of the most intractable.
Let me try to orient the Convention's dispute settlement system
within that broader regime for the settlement of disputes. What is
noteworthy about the Convention is not that it contains exceptions
to compulsory jurisdiction; that is to be expected given the fact that
the default position in international law is no compulsory jurisdic-
tion at all. What is noteworthy about the Convention is that it
reverses the default position that characterizes the general interna-
tional regime of dispute settlement: compulsory arbitration and
adjudication are accepted by the parties to the Convention as the
norm, on condition of important limitations and exceptions with-
out which this could not have been achieved and, in my view, could
not be sustained even now.
This nuanced relationship between rule and exception is evident
from the structure of Part XV of the Convention. Article 286 is the
very first article of Section 2 on compulsory settlement of disputes.
It provides: "Subject to Section 3, any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settle-
ment has been reached by recourse to Section 1, be submitted at
the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal hav-
ing jurisdiction under this Section."2 In just a few words, this text
makes clear that compulsory settlement of law of the sea disputes
under the Convention is the default position, but that this position
is reached only once the qualifications and exceptions to jurisdic-
tion in Sections 1 and 3, and the jurisdictional provisions of Sec-
tion 2, have been factored into the equation.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 286, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC].
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Thus, it is not correct to regard Section 2 on compulsory jurisdic-
tion as comprising the system for dispute settlement under the
Convention. Section 2, to be sure, is a very important and innova-
tive part of that system, but Sections 1 and 3 are also part of that
system. Similarly, it is not correct to regard the new International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which just celebrated its
tenth anniversary, as comprising the system for compulsory juris-
diction under the Convention. That Tribunal, to be sure, is a very
important and innovative part of the Convention's dispute settle-
ment system. For most disputes, however, there are two default
procedures for compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising under
the Convention. First, there are compulsory procedures entailing
a binding decision accepted by the parties under other agreements
outside of the Convention. This includes parties' declarations
under the Statute of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) and, it
would appear, the constitutive instruments of the European
Union. Second, there is compulsory arbitration under Annex VII
of the Convention.
3
It would, in my view, be correct to regard the dispute settlement
system of the Convention as one of the elements of a gradual shift
to greater acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in international
affairs. It would not be correct, however, to regard this objective as
in and of itself a primary explanation for the existence of the sys-
tem. One would search the Convention in vain for that particular
perspective, notwithstanding the fact that much of its preamble was
drafted by supporters of compulsory jurisdiction. The general
norm regarding dispute settlement set forth in the Convention is
copied more or less verbatim from Article 33 of the U.N. Charter,
which of course does not establish a requirement of arbitration or
adjudication.
4
In short, there is nothing in the Convention text as such to sup-
port the ambitious interpretations that have emerged in some
quarters regarding the reach of the Convention's compulsory juris-
diction provisions in general, and those concerning the ITLOS in
particular. If anything, there is much to suggest that such ambi-
tions could set off a counter-productive reaction among parties
and would-be parties alike-a reaction that might prejudice the
Convention's dispute settlement system and that might not be lim-
ited to the law of the sea. In this respect, there are clear warning
signals on the horizon. An increasing number of parties to the
3. See id. annex VII.
4. U.N. Charter art. 33.
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Convention that did not originally exercise their right to file decla-
rations under Article 298 of the Convention (excluding certain cat-
egories of disputes from compulsory jurisdiction) are now, years
later, filing such declarations. China did so just a few months ago.5
Explanations for such action may vary, but it should not surprise us
to learn that one of the explanations may be rooted in improvident
speculation regarding the scope of the compulsory dispute settle-
ment obligations under the Convention.
There were, to be sure, many people who believed deeply that
their work on the dispute settlement system of the Convention
would contribute to the development of a global compulsory dis-
pute settlement system. First among them was Louis Sohn. He
labored tirelessly and successfully as a member of the U.S. delega-
tion to achieve this. But Louis Sohn was wise enough to under-
stand that pressing this point was likely to have the opposite effect
in many foreign quarters, not to mention in some of the constitu-
encies he represented. The measure of achievement in the Con-
vention's dispute settlement system is the tapestry of procedural
complexity and substantive qualification that provided sufficient
reassurance to render agreement on compulsory jurisdiction possi-
ble in this treaty and more plausible in future treaties.
In this regard it is interesting to note that the Convention's dis-
pute settlement system has now been incorporated by reference
into a number of other global and regional treaties that address
specific aspects of the law of the sea. This includes an extraordi-
nary provision in the 1995 Implementing Agreement regarding
fish stocks that incorporates the Convention's dispute settlement
system not only into that Agreement but also into regional arrange-
ments mandated by that Agreement. 6 For those who follow such
matters, the effect is largely to reverse, for parties to the 1995
Agreement, the jurisdictional conclusion reached in the Southern
Bluefin Tuna (SBT) arbitration-a result, to be sure, presciently
foreseen and subtly encouraged by the very arbitral tribunal that
decided that it did not have jurisdiction under the Convention
5. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations made upon
Signature, Ratification, Accession or Succession or Anytime Thereafter, http://www.un.
org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/conventiondeclarations.htm (last visited July 13,
2007).
6. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 30(3), Aug. 4,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542.
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itself.7 In context, I think it is fair to conclude that it was the
imperatives of effective implementation of the provisions regard-
ing conservation and management of living resources in the Con-
vention that, in the end, prompted express agreement on this
further expansion of the reach of the Convention's dispute settle-
ment procedures-an agreement that now includes Japan, the suc-
cessful respondent in the SBT arbitration.
Let us then turn to some of the substantive objectives of the Con-
vention that the dispute settlement system was intended to rein-
force. One of the primary purposes of the compulsory dispute
settlement system was to enforce and fine-tune the careful balance
struck by the Convention between the rights of coastal states and
the freedoms enjoyed by all states. With respect to freedom of nav-
igation, this balance was achieved by the ITLOS decision on the
merits in the SAIGA case.8 With respect to protection of ships and
crews arrested for fisheries and pollution violations from pro-
longed detention pending trial, this balance was achieved by the
ITLOS prompt release procedure. 9 A second purpose of the dis-
pute settlement system was to enforce and fine-tune the relevant
provisions of the Convention mandating protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment as well as conservation of high seas
living resources. While ITLOS has used provisional measures pow-
ers to further the environmental and conservation goals of the
Convention, 10 the results on the merits have been mixed.
I had the honor to participate in one of the most interesting of
the environmental cases, the land reclamation dispute between
Malaysia and Singapore. In that case, there was a unanimous
ITLOS provisional measures order requiring the parties jointly to
commission a one-year study of the environmental effects of the
land reclamation project in question.1 The parties settled the dis-
pute following completion of the study. The settlement included
implementation of recommendations for minimizing any adverse
environmental effects of the project.
7. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v.Japan), 119 I.L.R. 508 (Int'l Trib.
L. of the Sea 2000).
8. See M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
1999).
9. See LOSC, supra note 2, art. 292.
10. See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Austi. v. Japan; N.Z. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R.
148 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999); MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. UK), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int'l Trib.
L. of the Sea 2001).
11. Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around Straits of Johor (Malay. V. Sing.)
(Req. Provisional Measures) (Order of Oct. 8, 2003) (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2003/document-en-230.pdf.
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Needless to say, quite apart from its substantive purposes, an
important object of the Convention's dispute settlement provisions
is to promote peaceful settlement of law of the sea disputes. In this
regard, it is reassuring to note that the record of compliance with
dispute settlement decisions rendered under the compulsory juris-
diction provisions of the Convention is excellent. The objective of
promoting peaceful settlement of disputes is particularly evident in
regard to maritime boundary delimitation disputes between oppo-
site or adjacent states. Absent declarations excluding such dis-
putes, they are subject to compulsory jurisdiction under the
Convention. That jurisdiction was invoked by Malaysia in one part
of the land reclamation case,1 2 by Barbados in the recently con-
cluded Annex VII arbitration with Trinidad and Tobago,' 3 and by
Guyana in the Annex VII arbitration with Suriname.
1 4
Beyond the decided cases, we need to consider whether the Con-
vention's dispute settlement system has promoted the unilateral
restraint and mutual cooperation necessary to avoid disputes or set-
tle them without arbitration or adjudication. One ITLOS case sug-
gests that it does.' 5 Many observers would agree that voluntary
compliance with the law, voluntary restraint, and voluntary agree-
ment settling disputes are perhaps the most significant indicia of
success for any system of rules. The problem is that these indicia of
success are very difficult to discern, let alone measure.
It may well be that the reason the number of prompt release
cases being brought before ITLOS has declined is that detaining
states have learned from the ITLOS decisions to take their prompt
release obligations seriously. If so, then the objectives of the
prompt release procedure would be realized. The only problem is
in ascertaining and measuring the role of the prompt release pro-
cedure in that success. To put it differently, would that success
exist, at least in the same degree, without the existence of the
prompt release procedure?
The international law of the sea is a branch of public interna-
tional law. Perhaps an even broader measure of success would be
12. See id.
13. Dispute Concerning the Maritime Boundary Between Barbados and Trinidad and
Tobago (Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago), http://pca-cpa.org (Oct. 30, 2004).
14. Dispute Concerning the Maritime Boundary Between Guyana and Suriname
(Guy. v. Surin.), http://pca-cpa.org (Feb. 22, 2005).
15. The Chaisiri Reefer 2 Case (Pan. v. Yemen) 2000 ITLOS Case No. 9, Order 2001/
3 (july 6, 2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/document en
104.pdf (detained vessel released on bond after application for prompt released filed with
ITLOS, but before the Tribunal acted).
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whether the dispute settlement system of the Convention has fur-
thered the objectives of a coherent system of international law.
That certainly seems to be the case. The decisions rendered under
the Convention clearly evidence an awareness of its role within the
larger system, a system in which the ICJ is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. In this connection, I must confess to
a certain measure of astonishment when I read learned commenta-
ries that suggest that the unprecedented achievement of an inte-
grated, widely-ratified regime for the governance of some two-
thirds of the planet (including, as part of that regime, a compul-
sory and binding dispute settlement system) somehow resulted in
some horrifying fragmentation of international law. Let me hasten
to assure you that I have the same reaction to such fretting about
other international law regimes as well, including trade and human
rights. The maturation of international law into the kind of com-
plex body of regimes and procedures that has long characterized
developed systems of law should be an object of celebration. I for
one do not long for the simpler days when we could fit it all into
one course and one under-utilized court.
True enough, we must turn our attention to the kinds of ques-
tions of substantive and procedural coordination that were previ-
ously addressed only by municipal law and private international
law. Louis Sohn, who began his career working on questions of
conflict of laws, 16 would have surely reminded us that the new ques-
tions of coordination faced by public international law have been
addressed in other contexts with some success. He would have
pointed to primary and secondary sources that made clear that no
matter how new the context in which these questions are posed,
there is something to be learned from the fruits of the kind of
thorough and scholarly search for precedent and analogy that all
of us came to expect from Louis Sohn.
Four different tribunals have sat on different aspects of the MOX
Plant dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom. So what?
If we are ever to learn how to manage a complex system, these
kinds of things must happen. At the end of the day, the applicant
did not get what it wanted from any one of those four tribunals.
What did emerge is a reassuring display of restraint and common
sense by the Annex VII tribunal constituted under the Convention.
This was followed by a breathtaking assertion of exclusive commu-
nity jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) whose full
16. See Thomas Buergenthal, Louis B. Sohn (1914-2006), 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 623
(2006).
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implications for the dispute settlement system under the Conven-
tion, and perhaps other treaties, have yet to be understood. One
of the most interesting aspects of this saga is that the ECJ was able
to determine its role in the system by reference both to European
instruments and to the overall dispute settlement structure of the
Convention, which can unquestionably accommodate a role for
regional tribunals.
Many people today are holding their breath in anticipation of a
possible decision by Chile and the European Community (EC) to
proceed with the cases respectively brought under the Convention
and World Trade Organization instruments in connection with
their dispute over fishing for swordfish. If so, the real question is
unlikely to be a clash of tribunals, but an appreciation of whether,
and to what extent, the global regimes for the oceans and for inter-
national trade have an impact on each other. The different tribu-
nals are merely institutional instruments of the respective regimes.
Viewed from this perspective, it becomes reasonably clear that the
trade regime has very little to say about whether the EC violated its
conservation obligations on the high seas and that the Convention
has very little to say about whether Chile violated its trade obliga-
tions with respect to European ships in its ports. None of the
potential combinations of outcomes in the two fora necessarily
entails any inconsistency.
There is, of course, the possibility that rights and obligations
under one regime do, or should, inform outcomes under the
other. Thus, it is possible that a decision as to the legality of Chil-
ean measures under the trade regime might, in some measure, be
informed by the extent to which those measures constituted a legit-
imate attempt to secure respect for international conservation obli-
gations under the law of the sea regime. In that case, an
interesting procedural question would be posed: would it make
more sense for a trade panel to decide the conservation question
itself or, knowing that an expert chamber of ITLOS constituted
under the Convention was seized of that underlying question
directly, should it await the outcome of the law of the sea litigation?
Such a decision would turn not on an a priori hierarchy of tribu-
nals or regimes but on a sensible decision as to the most rational
order of litigation in that particular case. That is the kind of sensi-
ble determination made by the Annex VII tribunal in the MOX
Plant litigation when it decided to await a decision of the ECJ, and,
perhaps more to the point, the kind of sensible lis pendens decision
made by municipal courts every day.
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So, to answer Sean Murphy's question about whether the dispute
settlement system is working: I think every successful legal institu-
tion is in some measure a work in progress. That is very much part
of its function. The only way we can achieve true stability and pre-
dictability in the law over time is by measured change. Viewed
from that perspective, I think there is good reason to conclude that
the dispute settlement system under the Convention is working
reasonably well now and may work even better in the future. It will
embrace, as intended, not only standing and ad hoc tribunals con-
stituted under the Convention but also the ICJ and other standing
and ad hoc tribunals, both global and regional.
For this reassuring prospect, we are indebted to many people. In
the forefront is Louis Sohn.
Thank you.
